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Abstract
For decades, the closed East/West border was an effective barrier for cross-border
interaction at a local and regional level. It was reflected, among other things, in production
structures and settlement patterns in the border regions. Since around 1990, economic and
other forms of cross-border linkages have been possible, and they have raised the issue
about adjustment processes, that is, whether regional and local economic actors are able to
utilise existing complementarities and create new ones, and how this will make itself felt
in the roles of the border regions in the international division of labour. 
The paper investigates regional adjustment processes in the case of the Finnish-Russian
border, which is characterised by one of the deepest socio-economic and cultural gaps in
Europe. First, the reasons for the specialisation of the neighbouring regional economies
under the period of the closed border are outlined. Against this background, the
repercussions of the partial opening of the border are evaluated in relation to the other
driving forces of their development trends in the 1990s. It is concluded that the regions on
both sides have lagged behind their respective national averages, although border-related
adjustment processes have had quite diverse economic impacts. In Finland, these impacts
have remained relatively marginal in most border regions. In the Russian borderlands,
some local and regional economies have undergone profound changes in their market
orientation due to the proximity of the border; instead of being specialised producers for
the Russian market, they are now locked in the international division of labour as
economic peripheries.1
1. Introduction
In recent years, state borders have received increased attention in regional development
studies. This interest has been boosted by the debate on the consequences of their
transformations; the arguments range from the visions of a borderless world to the findings
on how the functions and effects of state borders seem to be relatively persistent even in
the conditions of globalisation and European integration (see, e.g., van der Velde & van
Houtum 2000, van Geenhuizen & Ratti 2001).
Traditionally, a state border has been conceptualised as an institutional barrier which leads
to additional transaction costs in economic interaction, for instance, trade. These costs,
deriving from factors such as tariffs and legislative differences, are comparable to
additional distance between the regions, which are geographical neighbours but belong to
different jurisdictions. This tends to reduce economic interaction between them, and has
implications for their roles in the division of labour. Furthermore, the repercussions can be
seen in spatial structures, by reason of the fact that border-related barriers are reflected in,
for instance, the formation of labour market areas and commuting regions.
Clearly, border-related institutional barriers are not a separate phenomenon, but they are in
practice closely linked with other factors which have implications for the behaviour of
economic actors. These factors include, for instance, natural conditions, linguistic and
cultural differences and missing infrastructure networks. From this perspective, it makes
sense to classify border-related barriers according to their resistance to change by human
action (see Westlund 1999). For instance, it is possible to manipulate preconditions for
cross-border trade and investments by means of political agreements even in a short run,
but these measures can be utilised to a very limited extent, if not at all, for purposes of
changing mental attitudes and behavioural idiosyncrasies which can be of major
importance for the evolution of cross-border economic exchanges.
It goes without saying that numerous borders in Europe, as well as ongoing changes in
European borderlands, widely deviate from each other. The basic setting comprises two
opposite processes: on one hand, the Iron Curtain collapsed around 1990 and institutional2
barriers have been abolished on the internal borders of the European Union; on the other
hand, new nation states have been established, and their borders erected, in the aftermath
of the disintegration of the socialist system. The eastern enlargement of the EU will be the
next sea-change, which is bound to undermine the functions of some borders, and
emphasise the role of some others as barriers to economic and other human interaction.
The present paper attempts to analyse economic adjustment processes in the borderlands
next to the East/West divide in northern Europe. The empirical investigation concerns the
Finnish-Russian border regions since around 1990, that is, during the period when direct
cross-border links between individual actors have been allowed there. The aim is to reveal
the factors and mechanisms through which the partial opening up of the border - it can be
said to be ajar now - has been reflected in the economic dynamics of the border regions in
the Finnish-Russian case. In particular, it is asked how changes in the volumes and forms
of cross-border interaction and border-related disparities are linked to each other. This
question derives from the observation that at least thus far, the increased permeability of
the border has not implied a decrease in the economic gap on the border. Quite the
contrary, this gap has been on an increase, and it is currently one of the widest in Europe
in terms of GDP per capita (Alanen & Eskelinen 2000).
Since 1995, the Finnish-Russian border has also been a border - in fact the only land
border - between the European Union and the Russian Federation. It deviates from several
other eastern borders of the European Union in the sense that it can be assumed to
maintain its separating role much longer. Obviously, this emphasises the need to analyse
the evolution of regional and local cross-border interaction between Finland and Russia in
wider spatial and institutional contexts. The factors conditioning it include the relations of
the Russian Federation with the European Union, World Trade Organisation and United
States, integration processes in the Baltic Sea Region, as well as bilateral relations between
Finland and Russia. All these complex processes are interlinked, and economic and
political actors in the borderlands search for their roles in the resulting setting, which






























































































Figure 1. Share of Russia (USSR) of Finland’s exports in 1856-2001 (Vattula 1983, and National
Board of Customs 1979-2001).
The time-series in Figure 1 supports the view that institutional and political circumstances
do matter to cross-border economic interaction. Clearly, the role of Russia as a market to
Finnish firms has been conditioned by their changes. 
In the following, the research issues are formulated, firstly, by reviewing the roles of
border regions in economic and political integration, and discussing possible
interdependencies between changes in border-related economic disparities and cross-
border interaction (Section 2). Next, in Section 3, the particular border regions are
introduced by surveying their roles and developments before 1990 when the Finnish-
Russian border was practically closed to local and regional interaction. Section 4 gives an
empirical account on economic developments in the border regions and evolution of cross-
border economic links and disparities since the early 1990s. Finally, Section 5 attempts to
illustrate the mechanisms and consequences of cross-border economic interaction by
means of a case study.
The Finnish-Russian border region is approximately 1300 kilometre long in the north-
south direction, and it comprises several different sub-regions. The empirical findings in4
Sections 3 and 4 give a broad overview of the whole region, whereas the specific
investigation of cross-border dynamics in Section 5 focuses on the Karelian Republic in
the Russian Federation. 
2. Disparities and interaction
For obvious reasons, the repercussions of international economic integration on the
development of border regions form a topical concern in Europe. Several theoretical
traditions in economics, classical location theory and new economic geography among
them, provide arguments in support of the view that a reduction of institutional barriers
related to state borders may contribute to the development of border regions. These regions
may benefit from their geographical proximity to export markets, as market areas of
companies previously limited by institutional barriers expand. Another possible
mechanism derives from the fact that a weakened role of borders has implications for the
interplay of endogenous centrifugal and centripetal forces in spatial economic dynamics,
which may turn some border regions into transnational centres of economic activity.
However, it has to be emphasised that these are only possible outcomes, and one cannot
draw the straightforward conclusion that all border regions would benefit from deepening
international integration. Thus, the issue remains empirical in the final analysis: border
regions form a most heterogenous bundle, and changes in the functions of state borders
may have very different consequences in individual regions. (See Niebuhr & Stiller 2002)
As far as economic adjustment processes in border regions are concerned, a pertinent issue
concerns - in addition to their performance in terms of economic growth - the relationship
between cross-border flows and disparities, that is, whether increased cross-border
interaction tends to result in smaller disparities, or vice versa. This setting is outlined in
Figure 2.5
     Integration                       Homogenisation / differentiation
    Cross-border economic flows
Roles of border regions in terms of
economic structure, division of
labour, and level of development
Border regime
     Integration                       Homogenisation / differentiation
    Cross-border economic flows
Roles of border regions in terms of
economic structure, division of
labour, and level of development
Border regime
Figure 2. Economic adjustments on the border: interaction and differentiation. 
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Again, no sweeping generalisations can be drawn concerning the setting in Figure 2. The
volume of cross-border exchanges and the differentiation of the two sides of the border are
not correlated in any straightforward way, but their interplay may well be characterised by
different causal mechanisms. Obviously, disparities between the levels of economic
development and related socio-cultural factors derive usually from missing links: limited
interaction tends to lead to a cumulation of disparities. Yet this does not imply the
conclusion that improved preconditions for cross-border interaction would necessarily
imply reduced disparities. On one hand, existing major disparities may well serve as
effective obstacles to increased interaction, limiting functional integration processes of the
border regions. On the other hand, provided that the neighbouring regions possess
complementary resources which can be combined for utilising cross-border synergies, the
very same disparities provide incentives to cross-border exchanges, thus accelerating
integration processes, (e.g., cheap labour and high-level technological capacity).
In the present case, common institutional preconditions for cross-border interaction in the
meaning formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal constraints
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct)
2 did not exist, but their
creation has been a parallel process to the evolution of the cross-border exchanges. This
implies that the two issues of how actors in the border regions have reacted to the existing
disparities and complementary resources, and how they have participated in the creation of6
preconditions for cross-border exchanges, are intimately related to each other. When
analysing this setting, one has to keep in mind that there are different actors involved, and
their motives vary a great deal. The relevant economic actors are firms and consumers,
whereas public organisations, and at least to some extent also civil society organisations,
represent the policy side of interaction, that is, cooperation. This can clearly be seen in the
present case; all the above mentioned actors have in one way or another influenced the
formation of preconditions for cross-border exchanges, although local and regional actors
have to take the formal rules concerning the border regime largely as given.
In the Soviet times, the border regions were parts of the two completely different
institutional and political systems, which obviously contributed to growth of disparities
between them. Since the partial opening up of the border, this constellation has become
much more complicated in the sense that different actors have developed their own rules
of conduct, which may well have contradictory implications. Thus, a key question of the
empirical analysis concerns the issue of how various actors have reacted to the possibility
of crossing the border for whatever purposes, and how this has resulted in various causal
links between cross-border interaction and border-related disparities. Another important
question concerns possible competition between actors and the distribution of outcomes
from cross-border exchanges.
The above mentioned issues are investigated empirically in the following. The surveys in
Sections 3 and 4 give an overview on development patterns and trends. Then, a more
focussed analysis attempts to uncover causal mechanisms in one particular case. 
3. Border regions in the division of labour
In the Finnish-Russian case, as in many other European border regions, both the borderline
and its functions have undergone a number of changes during the past centuries. Figure 3
describes the current administrative division of the region.7
Figure 3. Finnish-Russian border region (shaded area = Finnish NUTS4 regions bordering Russia
and border districts in the Karelian Republic in Russia (see Table 1)).
When assessing ongoing processes in the Finnish-Russian border region, the most
important background factor is the long period of closure, from around 1920 to 1990. At
that time, the two sides had completely separate patterns of development, characterised by
the features which can be considered as textbook examples of the negative influences of a
divisive state border. For instance, the border split functional economic regions and cut off
infrastructure networks. The impacts of the metropolis, St. Petersburg, on southeastern
Finland ceased after the First World War; in the economic life of the region, it was not any
more an important centre of consumption, origin of tourism or destination of migration.
Respectively, the second city of Finland, Vyborg, was left on the other side of the border
after the Second World War (see, e.g., Eskelinen & Vartiainen 1996).
The about 70-year period of the closed border comprised of two distinctive sub-periods.
The decades before the Second World War were characterised by confrontation, whereas
political and economic relations between Finland and the USSR were intense in the 1945-
90 period (cf. Figure 1). In the present context, however, the issue worth most attention is8
the non-existence of cross-border cooperation in the meaning this concept is used in the
relevant body of literature: direct cross-border links between economic and other actors
were not allowed, and geographical proximity did not play an important role in developing
bilateral relations. This can be seen in the fact that the USSR’s share of exports was in
eastern Finland below the national average. The nature of the border was also clearly
demonstrated by the fact that there were only two crossing-points for international traffic,
and most border regions of the Soviet Union were completely closed to foreign visitors. 
The current administrative division of the Russian northwest dates back to the Soviet
period (see Fig. 3). Among the border regions, St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) has been by
far the main centre of gravity. Its role in the regional division of labour underwent a
complete overhaul as a result of the October Revolution. The capital and the gate to
Europe was transformed into one of the main centres of the Soviet military-industrial
complex. To a considerable degree, its demand was felt on the surrounding Leningrad
region, whose production base included food industry, shipbuilding and energy production.
The more northern border regions, Russian Karelia (the Karelian Republic since 1991;
Karelian ASSR in 1956-1991) and the Murmansk region are typical examples of the model
by means of which the natural resources of more peripheral regions were taken into use in
the Soviet Union. Large industrial complexes were established, often in one-company
towns, and in many cases, work camps played an important role in mobilising labour for
necessary infrastructure investments (see, e.g., Dmitrieva 1996, Kauppala 2000,
Blakkisrud & Hønneland 2001). Due to industrial expansion without major productivity
increases, population growth continued in Russian Karelia and the Murmansk region until
the final years of the Soviet Union.
Russian Karelia, which is analysed in more detail in Section 5, was developed as a forest
industry region in the internal division of labour in the Soviet Union. The regional
production complex comprised pulp and paper production, mechanical wood industry,
forestry and related engineering industries (forest tractors and paper machines). About
one-third of the Soviet Union’s newsprint production was in Russian Karelia, and about
one-tenth of the pulp production. The Murmansk region, for its part, was developed as a9
military base, whose civilian economy relied on mining and fishing industries.
The border regions along the Finnish side of the border did not differ from each other as
distinctively as their neighbours on the Soviet side. Already before the closing of the
border, Eastern Finland was specialised, quite in line with the standard theory of
international trade, on the utilisation of its most abundant resource, timber. The share of
the forest sector or cluster has been in recent decades in eastern Finland about two-fold in
comparison to the Finnish average, which for its part is very high in a European
comparison. Thus, the production structures of eastern Finland and its neighbouring region
on the Russian side of the border have in this respect resembled each other, although the
driving forces leading to this pattern of specialisation have been quite separate.
In terms of population dynamics, the development path of eastern Finland turned
downwards already in the 1960s. Technological and organisational changes cut jobs in the
forest sector, firstly in more northern forestry regions and later also in industrial areas in
the southeastern part of the region, which led to unemployment and outmigration. This
downward trend has continued since then, and the share of the country’s eastern part of
Finland’s economy and population base has declined to a considerable degree in recent
decades. To alleviate this problem, specific measures have been implemented, and they
have contributed to the growth of new economic activities, which do not rely on the
processing of local raw materials. Thus, the economy of eastern Finland has changed
towards human capital intensive industries, which attempt to derive their competitive
advantage from product differentiation and scale economies. At the same time, the spatial
structure of the region has evolved from an areal pattern towards a more nodal one so that
currently most local inhabitants live in small urban regions of 30 000 to 100 000 people.
Overall, these changes have increased the economic gap between the Finnish and the
Russian border regions, and they have also contributed to the depopulation of rural
communities next to the border. (Eskelinen 1999)
There is a body of literature analysing preconditions for successful cross-border
cooperation and interaction. Using its conclusions as a point of reference (see, e.g. van
Geenhuizen & Ratti 2001), the main implications of the above outlined stylized facts are10
clear-cut: in comparison to most relevant cases such as the other eastern external borders
of the European Union, the preconditions for cross-border integration have to be
considered poor in the Finnish-Russian case. In addition to the issues already mentioned,
the constraints include the sparse population base, linguistic and other cultural differences,
a potential border dispute (the so-called Karelian question, see Joenniemi 1998),
institutional incompatibility and lack of infrastructure (incl. border-crossing points).
4. Development trends since 1990
Anticipations concerning prospective impacts of cross-border economic and political
interaction run high during the birth of the new Russian Federation. As in many other
regions along the East-West Divide, historical experiences were transformed into visions
for the future. On both sides of the Finnish-Russian border, the partial opening up process
was seen as a major breakup with the past with regard to the region’s cul-de-sac position
(see, e.g., Katajala 1995).
Immediately, different types of economic and political actors - firms, individual citizens,
administrative units and civil society organisations - started to create links across the
border. Local and regional actors established contacts with their neighbours, and cross-
border tourism and other small-scale economic activities emerged. At about the same time,
in 1992, political and economic relations between Finland and Russia were rearranged on
a new institutional basis, including an agreement on the so-called neighbouring region
cooperation. In this agreement, the Russian Federation accepted the active role of regional
administrations in cross-border cooperation and interaction. Yet this did not result in the
stabilisation of the institutional basis for cross-border links, but the relevant regulations,
domains and procedures have been continuously in the state of uncertainty and flux. (See
Eskelinen 2000)
Currently, the first experiences from cross-border links and related developments in the
border regions can be evaluated from about one decade’s time perspective. In the
following, basic trends of demographic and economic developments as well as cross-11
border links are described.
3
As already noted, the border regions’ population base is small, St. Petersburg being the
obvious exception. Table 1 provides basic data, including a long-term projection for the
Finnish regions.
Table 1. a) Population changes in the Finnish and Russian border regions (see Fig. 3) in 1990-
2000, b) Population forecast for the Finnish border regions until 2030. (NUTS 4 regions in
Finland; four subjects of the Russian Federation and districts (rajon) in the Karelian Republic).
(Source: Statistics Finland).
a)
Population (1 000s) 1990 1995 2000 1990-2000
% change
FINLAND 4 986 5 108 5 181 3,9
Border regions (NUTS 4) 429 422 400 -6,8
RUSSIA 148 100 147 600 144 800 -2,8
St. Petersburg 5 002 4 769 4 628 -7,5
Leningrad province 1 663 1 668 1 659 -0,2
Karelian republic 798 784 761 -4,7
    Border districts 174 170 162 -6,8
Murmansk province 1 177 1 066 989 -16,0
b)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Population (1 000s) 376 364 353 345 337 328
Share of total population 7,2 6,9 6,7 6,5 6,3 6,2
The most striking observation is that the number of population has diminished in almost
all border regions. As a matter of fact, there are only two exceptions to this pattern at the
level of NUTS4 regions in Finland and districts in Russia: Lappeenranta in southeastern
Finland and Vyborg in Russia, which are both located along the Helsinki - St. Petersburg
transport corridor. Of the Russian regions, the Leningrad region has showed more positive
developments than the Federation on the average, whereas the trend of the Murmansk




























































































































































the population decline in the Finnish border regions will be prevailing pattern, in terms of
NUTS3, NUTS4 and NUTS5 regions.
GDP per capita is the most commonly used indicator of regional economic performance,
and disposable income per capita can be used to describe economic welfare. Figure 4
summarises statistical information concerning these key variables. 
Figure 4. a) GDP per capita in the Finnish border regions (NUTS4, see Fig. 3) in 1990-2000. b)
Disposable income per capita in the Finnish border regions (NUTS4) in 1995-2000. c) GDP per
capita in the Russian border regions in 1995-99. d) Average income per capita in the Russian
border regions in 1995-99. (Source: Statistics Finland. The figures are based on different
concepts, and are thus suitable only for intra-country comparisons.)
In Finland, most border regions lag behind the national averages with regard to GDP per
capita, and the disparity has not decreased in the 1990s. The redistributive mechanisms,
which favour poorer regions, have been curtailed in recent years, and therefore the gap
between the border regions and the national average in terms of disposable income per
capita was in 2000 wider than in the mid-1990s. On the Russian side of the border, the
ranking of the Karelian Republic has lowered in terms of both these indicators. 
With regard to the economic gap on the border between the neighbouring regions, the
prolonged economic crisis in Russia has been the most decisive determinant. It has13
resulted in the widening of the gap so that about one-third of the current disparity derives
from the 1990s. (Alanen & Eskelinen 2000)
However, at the same time when the economic gap has grown, most border regions have
lost population and they have been laggards in economic development in their national
context, border-crossings have been on a sharp increase. In 1990, a bit less than one
million people crossed the Finnish-Russian border. The almost continuous growth since
then has increased this figure up to 5,6 million crossings in 2001.
There is a lack of statistical data concerning economic flows such as trade and investments
between the border regions. In any case, even the more aggregate data in Table 2 makes it
possible to draw some tentative conclusions.
Table 2. Foreign trade of the border regions. a) Finland’s share of the exports of the Russian
border regions. (Source: http://www.hkkk.fi/ecomon). b) Russia’s share of the exports of North
Karelia (Finland’s easternmost NUTS3 region). (Source: Employment and Economic
Development Centre of North Karelia).
a)
2000 2001
St. Petersburg 8 n.a.
Leningrad province 12 13
Karelian Republic 30 30
Murmansk province 6 8
b)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Share of exports 3,5 5,2 3,0 3,6 3,3 3,4 2,3 2,3 4,0
Table 2 supports the view that the pattern of trade links is highly asymmetric. First,
Finland is a more important market for firms in the Russian border regions than Russia for
the firms in the Finnish border regions, although the role of St. Petersburg is also here
somewhat different. Secondly, the orientation of the Russian border regions towards the
west is not similar; the Karelian Republic being most tightly linked with its neighbouring14
Finland. 
The differences between the Russian border regions are important also with regard to
foreign investments. The city of St. Petersburg as well as the Leningrad region have been
relatively popular destinations for foreign investments, although investment volumes are
even in those regions small in an international comparison. Among the investors, there are
also Finnish firms, especially in food industries and retailing. In contrast, investments in
the Murmansk region and in the Karelian Republic have remained negligible after the
initial experiments in the early 1990s (see; http://www.hkkk.fi/ecomon).
The conclusions from the above observations are fairly clear-cut. In the turbulent years of
the Russian political and economic transition in the 1990s, the number of border-crossings
has skyrocketed, and Finland has gained an important role as a market for Russian border
regions in the adjustment process through which these regions have established direct links
with Western European economies. Yet at the time, most border regions, both in Russia
and in Finland, have not fared well in national rankings, and the economic gap between
them has grown.
At a closer look, there are considerable regional differences in the development patterns
and related cross-border links. This is not at all surprising against the background that the
border regions’ historical legacies are dissimilar, and they display distinctive
characteristics also in terms of geographical location, market potential as well as
development strategies and policies (see, e.g., Zimine 2001). In the following, the Karelian
Republic is put under a closer look. As observed in Sections 3 and 4, it resembles its
neighbouring region in Finland in terms of its production structure and its has also oriented
itself more strongly towards Finland than the other regions in northwestern Russia, but it
has fared worst among the Russian border regions. Here, the main question concerns the
mechanisms through which its location on the border has had implications for its
development. In this context, special attention has to be devoted to various cross-border
actors, that is, to how they have interaction and cooperation, and how they have been
involved in upgrading its preconditions.15
5. More cross-border links, wider disparities: the case of the Karelian Republic
As mentioned in Section 3, the Karelian Republic was specialised in the Soviet times in
the forest industry complex, whose main markets were in the European part of the USSR.
It has lost these markets almost completely in the transition period since the early 1990s.
To a considerable extent, this is due to the fact that its locational position has changed
dramatically: when transport costs affect the competitiveness of firms, which was not the
case in the Soviet economy, accessibility matters. Simultaneously as the regional economy
of the Karelian Republic has turned to western European markets, it has undergone a
deindustrialisation process: the bulk of its engineering industries has collapsed, and
currently its industrial base mainly comprises production of raw materials and semi-
processed goods. This is clearly visible, for instance, in the fact that the exports of
roundwood (to Finland) quadrupled, whereas the exports of sawn goods diminished to
one-fourth from 1990 to 1998. The proximity of the border has been an important driving
force in this restructuring process. Demand by forest-industry companies in the
neighbouring region, Eastern Finland, has been reflected in the price of roundwood, which
has weakened the competitiveness of local wood-processing firms, and also undermined
the attractiveness of the Karelian Republic as a target for foreign investments. Currently,
approximately about two-thirds of the industrial and raw material production in the
Karelian Republic is exported, Finland’s share of these exports being about one-third.
In the same vein as the other regions in the Russian Federation, the Karelian Republic has
strengthened its role as a political and institutional actor in the aftermath of the
disintegration of the USSR - although it remains an open issue whether this change
represents regionalisation by design or by default. In any case, the political initiatives of
the Karelian Republic have extended to the realm of international relations. This is shown,
for instance, by the fact that it has established a cross-border cooperative region, Euregio
Karelia, in collaboration with its neighbouring regions in eastern Finland. The
establishment of the Euregio Karelia aims at creating a more permanent institutional basis
for joint development strategies across the border. (Cronberg 2000) For the present
purposes, however, it has to be emphasised that irrespective of these initiatives, the
fundamentals of economic policies clearly remain outside the competence of the Republic.16
From the point of view of an export-oriented economy, such as the Karelian Republic, the
currency exchange rate is a most important policy parameter, and it is decided at the level
of the Federation. The same applies to customs duties and the foreign trade regime in
general. Thus, the dynamics of the Karelian Republic is, to a major extent, conditioned
exogenously, by the cyclical fluctuations of international markets and by the trade and
exchange rate policies of the Russian Federation. In addition, the political and economic
turbulence of Russia has been a permanent shadow on all its regions, weakening their
competitiveness for foreign as well as domestic investments. Given these obvious
limitations of the Karelian Republic with regard to the fundamentals of economic policies,
its governments have turned their attention to more detailed forms of policy intervention,
by means of which they have tried to secure raw material supplies to firms and repatriate
export incomes to the regional economy. However, this kind of policy activism does not
encourage prospective foreign investors, but rather has adverse effects. In these conditions,
also investments in assembly-type manufacturing production have remained negligible,
even if the major difference in production costs is a clear-cut incentive to foreign firms.
Another reason for the lack of investments is the production structure of eastern Finland:
labour intensive manufacturing production such as clothing and electronics industries,
which could benefit from low labour costs of subcontractors next door, do not play any
important role there.
As a whole, the Karelian Republic is caught in the development trap of a raw material
exporter, the formation of which has been influenced by the proximity of a border.
(Druzhinin 2001) Its geographical location has provided the regional economy with access
to new markets, but it has been difficult to expand the production capacity in the
conditions when local raw materials have competitive uses and economic policies have to
be taken as an exogenous variable. Yet it has to stressed that this is only one part of the
story on how the impact of the border has been felt in the Karelian Republic.
The major economic gap on the border has provided many opportunities for small-scale,
more or less informal economic activities by individual citizens. In a small regional
economy such as the Republic is, their impact is considerable. This was observed in a case
study concerning a border town (district) on the Russian side. Finnish visitors to the town17
of Sortavala (with approx. 35 000 inhabitants) were found to purchase goods and services
(typically petrol and alcohol) of the monetary value which is more than ten-fold in
comparison to the municipal budget. (Eskelinen & Zimine 2001) For the most part, this
business activity is not registered in official statistics, and there are negative externalities
such as crimes and diseases linked with it. Yet, together with shuttle-trading and other
short-term visits by local inhabitants to Finland, it has formed the main income source to
many people in the turbulent circumstances of the Russian transition. Overall, these typical
border activities, bazaar economy and shuttle-trading, have in a way compensated for the
deindustrialisation in the formal economy caused by price increases. On the other hand,
one may well ask whether informal economic activities crowd out people from the formal
economy, and what will be the repercussions for the development of human capital in a
long run.
6. Conclusions
Obviously, the prolonged economic and political crisis in Russia has, to a major degree,
conditioned developments even in the northwestern regions of the Federation. However,
these regional economies also display characteristics which derive from their location
close to the border of Finland and the European Union. This geographical proximity has
provided these peripheral border regions with possibilities to initiate economic interaction
and create cooperative political relations with their neighbours and other western European
partners.
In general, the experiences of the border regions in the North-West Russia demonstrate
that increased cross-border interaction does not necessarily imply smaller cross-border
disparities. In the present case, even if the transition crisis is the main reason for the
widening disparities, the pattern of cross-border economic interdependencies seem to have
worked to the same direction. Major institutional and socio-cultural differences, political
risks caused by the Russian crisis, and also the spacio-economic structure of the border
regions (in particular, the lack of economic actors and infrastructure in these peripheral
regions) have contributed to the fact that large differences in production costs have not18
been sufficiently lucrative incentives for attracting investments.
The development of the Finnish-Russian border regions and their mutual links can be
interpreted in terms of the concept “active space” (van Geenhuizen & Ratti 2001).
According to it, the key issue concerns whether economic and other actors in the border
regions are able learn together, and establish a joint strategy for improving their
competitive positions by means of cross-border synergies and upgrading their positions in
relation to their respective national centres of decision–making (cf. Blatter & Clement
2000). From this perspective, an important dilemma of the cross-border interaction and
cooperation in the Finnish-Russian case is in that different forms of border-crossings -
formal economic links, informal business activities by individual citizens, official political
cooperation by actors at various spatial levels, and interaction between organisations of the
civil society - have evolved quite separately from each other. Their interdependencies have
remained minimal; for instance, cross-cultural competencies which have been created
among the local citizens have not yet been identified in the formal political and economic
cooperation. In particular, as economic actors in eastern Finland have not had major
interests towards Russia, programmes of political cooperation have been implemented
separately from cross-border economic interaction. One reason for this state of affairs is
also the fact that precautionary measures against the so-called soft security threats - quite
understandably as such - have been the main motive for cross-border cooperation. In any
case, a more integrated cross-border strategy is clearly needed, as it is obvious that the
widening of the economic gap tends to fuel soft security threats.
Endnotes
1 Adjusted from Rietveld (2001); originating from Cattan & Grasland (1992).
2 Institutions refer here to “...the humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic and social interaction.” (North 1990, 97).
3 Here, the most important source is the Economic Monitoring of North-West Russia,
Biannual Economic Review (2000-2001). It has produced comparative reports on
economic development: see http://www.hkkk.fi/ecomon/ 19
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